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Why Do Networks Cascade? 
T. G. Lewis 
The Problem 
q Why do networks such as Electric Power Grids 
and Traffic Systems tend to propagate and 
magnify small faults across major portions of the 
network, leading to major or total network failure? 
 
§  Example: 2003 Blackout of NE USA 
 
§  Example: Gridlocked Automobile, Mass Transit, and 
Airline Systems 
Some Approaches 
q Cascading as Domino Effect 
§  Analog: Rollback/Recovery of Distributed Computer 
Systems 
 
q Cascading as Persistent Epidemic 
§  Analog: Spread of Contagious Disease in Animal 
Populations 
 
q Cascading as Unstable Linear System Dynamic 
§  Analog: Unbounded Oscillation in Electrical Control 
System Circuits = Chaos  
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M = Mark (Save State of Sends/Receives)	

R = Receive (incoming link)	

S = Send (outgoing link)	

































































Limits of Domino Theory 
q Russell (1980) showed how to avoid domino effects in 
systems by constraining them to MR*S* networks. 
 
Russel, D. L., “State Restoration in Systems of Communicating 
Processes,” IEEE Trans Software Engineering, SE-6, 2, (March 
1980), pp. 183-194 
 
q Not always possible to restructure infrastructure systems 
as MR*S* systems. 
 
q Failure may be probabilistic, not deterministic. 
Epidemics: “Random Failure” 
q  Epidemic analog: Nodes fail with probability 
equivalent to infection rate, γ	

q Infection = Fault 
q Epidemic = Fault propagation via links 
q Infection Rate = Probability of failure =  0 ≤ γ ≤ 1	

q Recovery Rate = Probability of recovery = 0 ≤ Δ ≤ 1 
q System Failure = Persistence (depends on τ = Δ/γ) 
q  Models: 
q SIR = Susceptible-Infected-Recovered = Dies out 
q SIS = Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible = May Be Persistent 







































































Epidemics in Networks 
Question: Does this Epidemic Ever Die Out?	

Persistent Epidemics 
q  Persistent (SIS) Epidemics Imply Non-
Recoverability in CIP 
q Kermack-McKendrick Model ignores Network Connectivity	

q Network connectivity measures: λ = mean degree, and 
spectral radius, ρ(A) = largest non-trivial eigenvalue of 
A. 
q Wang, Chakrabarti, Wang, and Faloutsos (WCWF model) 
showed persistence in arbitrary network occurs when 




Wang, Z., Chakrabarti, D., Wang, C., and Faloutsos, C, “Epidemic spreading 
in real networks: an eigenvalue viewpoint”, Proceedings of 22nd International 
Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, ISBN 1060-9857, (6-18 October 
2003). 	

Network Failure = SIS Persistence 
q  Persistence in Networks depends on network topology as defined 




q Random Networks: persistent epidemic occurs with probability (1-
τ):  
•  τ = Δ/γλ; 	

•  Δ = recovery rate,  
•  γ = infection rate,  
•  λ = mean node degree = ρ(A) 
 
q Scale-Free Networks: persistent epidemic occurs if  
•  τ ≤ ρ(A) 
•  Δ/λ ≤ ρ(A) 
q Star Network:  
	
τ = ρ(A) = sqrt(n-1). (Worst-case scale-free network) 
Spectral Radius Analysis 






















       = 1.15 (exceeds 100%)	

Recovery Rate must be 2.3 times Infection Rate	

Not possible in this case	

Intuitive Explanation 
n = 13; γ = 1/2; λ = 12	








τ  > Δλ/γλ = Δ/γ -> dies out 
Linear relationship between	

connectivity and ρ(A): 	

Empirical Evidence That Structure Matters 
q  Protect a node; randomly infect a node; propagate fault. 	

q  Simulation Results: Protect Random vs Hub Node*	

q Random Network: 99% -> 94% Nodes Fail	

q Scale-free Network: 78% -> 66% Nodes Fail	

q  Conclude: Scale-free networks are more resilient w.r.t. persistent 
epidemic failure than random	

q  Conclude: Protecting hubs more effective than random hardening 
of a node.	

* Lewis, T. G. “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Defending a 
Networked Nation,” Wiley, 2006. 
Limits of Epidemic Analog 
q Assumes: 
q Faults resemble epidemics  
q All nodes/links fail with same probability, γ	

q Bi-directional links 
q Does persistence occur with probability 1-τ?	

Networks as Linear Systems 
q Kirchhoff Network: Sum of Outputs Equals 
Sum of Inputs 
q Traffic Networks 
q Electric Power Grids 
q Gas/Oil Pipelines 
q Commercial Airline Networks 
 
q Kirchhoff Stability: Difference between sum 












q A Kirchhoff Network is stable if: 
q Largest eigenvalue of [B-2I] is less than 1.0, 
and 
q There exists network cycles with lengths L1 and 
L2, such that L1, L2 are relatively prime. 
 
Elements of B: b[i,j] = zero, or 1/out_degree[i], if j 
-> i are connected nodes. 










































Stability Theory Limits 
q  Not all networks are Kirchhoff Networks. 
q Ignores storage, for example 
q Σ Inputs ≠ Σ Outputs, e.g. Internet 
 
q  No proof that instability -> cascade failure 
q Would Kirchhoff stability prevented 2003 Blackout? 
 
q  No (current) method of identifying minimum cost 
link(s) needed to stabilize an arbitrary network. 
q Where is the best place to add a (redundant) link to the power 
grid? 
q Links cost $: what is the lowest-cost addition? 
Bottom Line 
q The Problem of Modeling Cascade Failure 
in Critical Infrastructure Protection remains 
unsolved. Evidence: 2003 Blackout 
q Network Analysis shows promise as an 
approach: 
q Protecting hubs reduces cascading 
q Inserting links stabilizes Kirchhoff networks, but 
says nothing about general networks. 
q Ignores non-linear effects -- if there are any! 
Policy Implications 
q  Current CIP focus is on “target hardening” 
q Single-asset focus vs. system of assets 
q Most analysis is static vs dynamic 
q Owner/Operators lack tools 
e.g. strategy = harden hubs; add links 
q  Design for Security 
q Safety/Security guidelines promoting anti-cascading systems 
e.g. strategy =incentives to add stabilizing tie-lines to the electrical 
power grid 
q  Regulation (Interstate and otherwise) 
q Can change in regulation lead to greater redundancy, reliability, 
stability, robustness? 
e.g. strategy = regulations that restructure networks to dissipate 
hubs; add (stabilizing) links 
 
Questions? 
Ted Lewis 
TLewis@nps.edu 
(831)-656-2830 
